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Chapter 1

Employers’ Perspectives
on Delayed Retirement

Many policy analysts, economists, and demographers have argued

that individuals must extend their work lives if they are to achieve
their desired standard of living in retirement. Increases in longevity
imply that individuals who leave the labor force at traditional retirement ages must either save more during their working careers or
consume less during their retirement. Reductions in the generosity of
employer- and government-funded retirement programs exacerbate
this problem. Thus, workers today must save more than their predecessors to achieve the same level of retirement well-being. The idea
seems clear—working longer and retiring later is the only way future
retirees can sufficiently finance their retirement.
Later retirement can be achieved by remaining in one’s career job
until an older age. Alternatively, individuals can retire but not immediately leave the labor force. Instead, they can begin a retirement transition that includes moving through different types of employment;
for example, an employer could offer shorter hours or a less stressful
working environment.
Despite the logic that working longer is needed to support more
years in retirement, relatively few studies have directly addressed
employer interests and the constraints that might lead companies and
organizations to resist delayed retirement from career jobs. This book
seeks to fill this gap by providing a comprehensive assessment of the
costs and benefits to employers of accommodating later retirement
ages. Employers that oppose later retirements could adopt employment and compensation policies to impede or limit workers’ opportunities to remain on the job.
Economic theory based on profit maximization indicates that
companies must determine the optimal number of workers to hire and
also the appropriate age and skill composition of their workforces. The

1

2 Clark and Morrill

firm will need a mix of employees with different skill sets and skill
levels and who have different vintages of human capital. To maximize profits, companies need the right number and the optimal mix of
workers. Changes in the age structure of a company’s workforce due
to delayed retirement can affect labor costs, productivity, profitability,
and sustainability. In the following chapters, we argue that companies
develop their compensation policies in order to attract, retain, motivate, and ultimately retire their desired workforces.
Increased life expectancy and associated modifications to public
and private retirement-related policies will lead workers to alter their
career paths. Desired increases in the duration of work life can come
in several forms as workers experience new pathways from full-time
work to complete retirement. That transition has become an important
phase of work life. Indeed, how this transition is made, and whether it
is done successfully, will affect an individual’s well-being throughout
retirement.
Changes in government policy that increase eligibility ages for
retirement benefits, coupled with increased life expectancy and the
continuing evolution of employer retirement programs, will lead
many workers to try to extend their work lives by delaying the onset
of complete retirement. With the exception of the economic downturn during 2007–2009, labor force participation rates of persons
65 and older have been steadily climbing since the mid-1980s. One
method of extending work life is to delay the start of the transition to
retirement and simply work longer at the current job. Alternatively,
workers could prolong the transition period from full-time work to
full retirement by including intermediate work-related steps, such as
phased retirement, bridge jobs, or self-employment.1
Whether workers delay the start of the transition, increase the
time spent in transition, or increasingly take alternative paths from
career job to retirement, employers must consider the advantages and
costs of retaining or hiring older workers. The expanding potential
labor pool of older workers, particularly among those with relatively
high stocks of human capital, could provide an unexpected bonus to
employers through greater returns on their investment in long-term
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employees. However, older workers often are relatively highly compensated, and some will experience diminished productivity at older
ages. Furthermore, as employers retain older workers, younger workers’ opportunities for advancement might be restricted.
Employers must address the changing demographics in their
workforces. By creating compensation and employment policies to
accommodate prolonged or delayed retirement transitions, they will
be better positioned to reap the benefits of employing older workers.
This book examines the employer perspective on how to respond
to the needs and desires of older workers to delay or prolong the transition from full-time employment to complete retirement. What factors influence the willingness of firms to retain older workers? Can
firms develop transitional employment contracts so workers can shift
to new areas, perhaps with less responsibility and lower compensation, while remaining with their career employers? While exploring
the bottlenecks and constraints that might inhibit the development
of delayed retirement policies, this book provides new insights into
how retirement transitions might proceed in the coming years and the
potential implications and effectiveness of government and employer
policies regarding retirement ages.

EMPLOYEE PREFERENCES FOR LATER RETIREMENT
Retirement decisions are influenced by economic and demographic factors, including real income, personal savings, health
and family issues, job opportunities, and retirement plans, such as
employer pensions and Social Security. As these determinants have
changed over time, so has the average age of retirement. For most
of the twentieth century, the labor force participation rate of older
persons declined in response to rising real incomes, improving health,
changes in the physical demands of many jobs, the introduction of
defined benefit pension plans, and the establishment and liberalization of Social Security and Medicare. Earlier retirement coupled with
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increasing life expectancy placed a premium on planning and saving
for retirement.
In the mid-1980s, the proportion of older persons who remained
in the labor force began to increase. This reversal of a long-term
trend toward earlier retirement began as employers switched from
defined benefit to defined contribution plans, which have very different retirement incentives. In addition, changes to Social Security also
encouraged later retirement.2 Finally, the continued increase in life
expectancy at older ages made financing a longer period of retirement
increasingly difficult. All these factors have encouraged older workers to remain in the labor force and delay retirement.
For most of the twentieth century, increasing life expectancy
coincided with a decline in the age at which most people permanently
left the labor force. Rising real income, along with the development
of employer pensions and national retirement programs, made retirement possible for millions of American workers; it became an important phase in life. Workers planned for retirement and made saving
and consumption decisions in order to achieve their desired standard
of living during their final years.
Increase in Life Expectancy and the Need for Working Longer
The number of years of expected retirement is determined by the
age of retirement and the life expectancy at the retirement age. For
example, if a worker enters the labor force at age 20, expects to retire
at age 65, and has a life expectancy at age 65 of 15 years, the individual has 45 years of work to accumulate the resources to finance 15
years of retirement. However, if the expected retirement age fell to
60 and life expectancy at age 60 increased to age 85, the individual
would have 40 years of work to save for 25 years in retirement. Of
course, these changes would require a much higher annual saving
rate in order to finance the same standard of living in retirement. In
contrast, delaying retirement increases work and saving years while
decreasing the number of retirement years that need to be supported.
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Next we consider some actual changes in life expectancy and their
impact on retirement decisions.
As shown in Table 1.1, male life expectancy at age 65 increased
by 3.9 years between 1980 and 2014—from 14.1 years to 18.0 years.
Females continue to have more years of expected life remaining at
age 65; however, the gender difference in life expectancy declined
from 4.2 years in 1980 to 2.5 years in 2014. Holding the age of retirement constant with rising life expectancy means more years in retirement. Thus, in order to finance the same level of annual consumption
in retirement with the longer life expectancy, workers must save more
while working.
To illustrate the magnitude of the need for additional saving, let us
consider a male worker retiring at age 65 with 14 years of remaining
life who has saved $250,000 to help finance his retirement. Assume
that he purchases a life annuity that provides a fixed income per year
until death. With an assumed life expectancy of 14 years and using a 3
percent interest rate, column 1 in Table 1.2 shows that he could anticipate annual income of $22,132. Now consider a similar retiree with
18 years of expected life remaining. Based on the additional years
of payouts, the same $250,000 account balance would provide only
$18,177 per year of income. Table 1.2 also shows how the annual
Table 1.1 Life Expectancy at Birth and Age 65, by Gender
Men
Year
1970
1980
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2014

Birth
67.1
70.0
71.8
72.5
74.1
75.0
76.2
76.4

Women
65
13.1
14.1
15.1
15.6
16.0
16.9
17.7
18.0

SOURCE: National Center for Health Statistics (2015).

Birth
74.7
77.4
78.8
78.9
79.3
80.1
81.0
81.2

65
17.0
18.3
18.9
18.9
19.0
19.6
20.3
20.5
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payout will continue to decline to only $16,804 if life expectancy at
age 65 rises to 20 years.
Column 2 in Table 1.2 demonstrates the impact of rising life
expectancy in a slightly different manner. Assume that the individual wishes to have sufficient resources to have an annual income of
$25,000 from her retirement savings. With a life expectancy of 14
years, the worker would need to have saved $282,402 in order to have
income of $25,000 per year; however, if the number of expected retirement years rises to 18, the worker must have an account balance of
$343,838.3 These examples show that, holding constant the retirement
age, rising life expectancy requires either greater saving to achieve a
desired annual income or for the worker to accept a lower standard
of living in retirement if lifetime saving is unchanged. Alternatively,
individuals could choose to work longer and delay retirement, thus
offsetting the longevity gains by more years of work. Working longer
may be the optimal response to longevity gains for many individuals,
and how this preference for delayed retirement affects firms is the
central focus of this book.
Table 1.2 Impact of Longevity Gains on Retirement Income ($)
(1)
(2)
Account balance
Account balance
of $250,000 provides
needed to yield annual
Years of remaining life
annual payout of
distribution of $25,000
14
22,132
282,402
15
20,942
298,448
16
19,903
314,028
17
18,988
329,153
18
18,177
343,838
19
17,453
358,095
20
16,804
371,937
NOTE: Values are determined using a 3 percent interest or discount rate, with annual
payments occurring at the end of each year. The values shown in column (1) indicate
the annual payout from an account balance of $250,000 for the indicated number of
years. The values shown in column (2) indicate the account balance needed to provide an annual payout of $25,000 throughout retirement.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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The challenge is that workers must save more and consume less
while working or be satisfied with lower income and hence consumption in retirement. An alternative to these choices is to work longer
and delay retirement. Working longer means the individual has more
years of earnings and saving. It also allows additional years of compounding returns on retirement saving. Later retirement also implies
fewer years in retirement over which these funds will be drawn down.
Employee Benefits and Retirement Incentives
Employers are moving away from defined benefit pension plans
in favor of defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans. Defined
benefit plans promise retirees a monthly benefit for life; therefore,
increases in life expectancy increase the present value of retirement
benefits and, of course, increase the cost to the employer.4 While the
real value of pension benefits will decline with inflation, the nominal
monthly benefit will continue at the same rate throughout the longer retirement period. Thus, retirees with a defined benefit pension
are exposed to inflation risk if cost of living adjustments do not adequately increase the real value of the benefit.
Pension plan participants who have reached the normal retirement age must decide whether they want to retire and start their benefits or work an additional year. The extra year of work will increase
subsequent pension benefits, but the individual typically will not
receive benefits during this time. Thus, the worker can compare the
gain of marginally higher future benefits for the remainder of life to
the loss of the current year’s benefit. Increases in life expectancy will
have a rather small effect on the employee’s calculation of optimal
retirement age.
In contrast, workers covered by a 401(k) plan must decide how
to use the account balance in their retirement plans. Assume that this
balance is used to purchase a life annuity. Holding constant the retirement age and the account balance, increases in life expectancy will
reduce the annual payout from the annuity. The 401(k) participant
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can consider the possibility of working an additional year and thus
postpone the purchase of the annuity. The individual is not giving
up a year of benefits by postponing retirement but instead is simply
able to purchase a larger annuity the following year. By working an
extra year, not only does the account balance grow but the number
of years in retirement is also reduced, so the payout from the annuity
will rise. In general, increases in life expectancy for participants in
defined contribution plans are likely to provide a greater incentive for
individuals to remain in the labor force.
This discussion illustrates how the change from defined benefit
plans to defined contribution plans has altered retirement incentives
and encouraged individuals to remain on the job. Over the past 75
years, changes in employer compensation and employment policies
first contributed to the decline in the average age of retirement and
then provided additional incentives for individuals to want to remain
on the job until older ages.
Social Security Reforms and the Value of Delayed Claiming
of Benefits
Most American workers are covered by Social Security, and
many retirees receive a significant portion of their household income
from Social Security.5 An important determinant of the annual benefit
is the age at which benefits are begun or the claiming age for Social
Security. Over the years, the age for “full benefits” and the value of
delaying claiming have increased. For individuals born between 1943
and 1954, current rules state that the age for full retirement benefits is
66.6 At this age, individuals claiming benefits will receive 100 percent
of their primary insurance amount (PIA).7 Alternatively, workers can
claim “early” benefits at age 62. However, when individuals claim
benefits prior to age 66, their monthly benefits are reduced by fiveninths of 1 percent per month for the first 36 months and five-twelfths
of 1 percent for each additional month. Delaying claiming benefits
until after age 66 increases benefits by 8 percent per year up to age
70. To illustrate the impact of these rules, assume that if benefits are
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begun at the full retirement age of 66, the monthly benefit will be
$1,000. If benefits are claimed at 62, the earliest age of eligibility, the
monthly benefit is only $750, or a 25 percent reduction in monthly
benefits for the rest of one’s life. Despite these penalties for early
claiming, almost half of all individuals claim benefits at age 62.8
There is also a delayed retirement credit of 8 percent per year for
individuals who postpone claiming benefits until age 70. If a claimant
who expects a benefit of $1,000 at age 66 postponed claiming benefits
until age 70, the monthly benefit would increase to $1,320 per month.
When claiming benefits at age 70 compared to 62, the monthly benefit is 76 percent greater.9 On average, the present value of benefits
is approximately the same regardless of when the benefits are started
(Social Security Trustees 2014). However, one should note the substantial difference in monthly benefits based on the age at which a
person claims benefits.
Recent studies have argued that, under current law, the expected
present value of lifetime Social Security benefits rises as claiming is
postponed for each month after the individual reaches age 62. Shoven
and Slavov (2014a,b) illustrate that, for most households, delaying the start of Social Security benefits results in a higher lifetime
present value of these benefits. They also point out that the gain in
lifetime benefits with delayed claiming has been increasing because
of changes in Social Security rules (e.g., an increase in the delayed
retirement credit after the full retirement age), lower real interest
rates, and increases in life expectancy for individuals in their sixties.
Shoven and Slavov (2013, p. 1) state, “With today’s life expectancies
and today’s extremely low interest rates, it is in almost everyone’s
interest to delay the commencement of Social Security. For many
people, delaying to 70 is the value maximizing strategy.”10
The age at which an individual claims her Social Security benefits
has a major impact on her annual income in retirement. While claiming benefits does not require one to stop working, many individuals
would find it difficult to leave the labor force and not claim Social
Security benefits. Clearly, changes in age-related rules governing
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benefits have increased incentives for individuals to continue working and delay claiming benefits. Increases in life expectancy holding
the age rules constant only strengthen the incentive to delay claiming.
When developing and modifying their own retirement policies in an
effort to achieve the desired workforce, employers must consider the
impact of policy reforms and their effect on worker behavior.
Working Longer Because of Health Concerns, the Cost of
Health Insurance, and the Decline in Employer-Provided Health
Insurance in Retirement
An important component of a secure retirement is access to
affordable health care. As individuals age, they face an increased risk
of having a costly adverse health event. They must accumulate sufficient wealth to be prepared for the possibility of extensive and expensive medical treatment. Medicare provides basic coverage for most
individuals aged 65 and older but does not cover expenses for chronic
conditions and treatments, including long-term care. Individuals who
are poor or disabled may qualify for Medicaid as a secondary payer.
Some research has considered why individuals do not purchase longterm-care insurance at higher rates and whether Medicaid crowds out
private long-term-care insurance (e.g., Brown, Coe, and Finkelstein
2007).
Workers without access to health insurance in retirement might
postpone retiring until they are eligible for Medicare (e.g., Mermin,
Johnson, and Murphy 2007). Conversely, recent research has documented a strong link between employer-provided retiree health insurance and earlier retirement ages (e.g., Fitzpatrick 2014; Robinson and
Clark 2010; Shoven and Slavov 2014c).
Access to health insurance can alter retirement timing, and
employer-provided retiree health insurance may be an important
aspect of retirement transitions. While providing retiree health insurance may be an effective strategy for employers to encourage earlier
retirements, it is a costly benefit that is rapidly disappearing. The Kaiser
Family Foundation and the Health Research and Educational Trust

Employers’ Perspectives on Delayed Retirement 11

(2015) report that only 23 percent of firms with 200 or more workers
that offer health benefits to their active employees extend this coverage to retirees—down from 66 percent in 1988. The rising cost of
health care at older ages, along with the decline in employer-provided
retiree health insurance, has made early retirement costlier and influenced workers to delay leaving their career jobs. If the promise of
health insurance in retirement encourages workers to retire before age
65, then employer decisions to eliminate this benefit may provide an
incentive for workers to remain on the job. This analysis highlights a
dilemma that confronts employers—the need to control the costs of
health care associated with early retirement without adversely affecting the desired retirement ages of their workers.
The Increasing Labor Force Participation of Older Persons
Through most of the twentieth century, the average age of retirement declined despite increases in life expectancy.11 This reduction in
labor force participation among older persons has been attributed to
rising per capita income (Costa 1998), the enactment of Social Security, and the spread of employer pensions (Quinn, Burkhauser, and
Myers 1990). The labor force participation rates of men 65 and older
fell from about 46 percent in 1950 to about 16 percent by the mid1980s (Toosi 2002). However, during the past two decades this trend
has reversed, and the proportion of the older population in the labor
force has increased.
Between 1994 and 2014, there have been substantial changes in
the proportion of older men in the labor force. Table 1.3 illustrates
the increase in the labor force participation rates of older men and
women. The largest changes for men have been for individuals aged
62 and older. The rate for men aged 62–64 increased from 45.1 percent to 56.2 percent during this period, while the rate for men aged
65–69 rose from 26.8 percent to 36.1 percent. Even the rates for men
aged 70–74 increased substantially, from 15.8 to 22.8 percent. Participation rates for women followed a similar pattern; however, the
increases were greater for younger women. The proportion of women

12
Table 1.3 Labor Force Participation Rates for Men and Women Aged
55 and Older (%)
Men
Women
Age
1994 2004 2014 2024
1994 2004 2014 2024
55–59
76.9 77.6 76.8 76.3
59.2 65.0 66.4 72.2
60–61
64.8 64.9 69.7 69.7
45.3 54.0 57.6 64.8
62–64
45.1 50.8 56.2 59.9
33.1 38.7 44.7 47.1
65–69
26.8 32.6 36.1 40.0
17.9 23.3 27.5 32.8
70–74
15.8 19.4 22.8 26.6
8.7 12.0 15.6 18.5
75 and older 8.6
9.0 11.0 13.5
3.5
4.3
5.9
8.4
SOURCE: Toosi (2015).

aged 55–59 who were in the labor force rose from 59.2 to 66.4 percent, and the rate for women aged 60–61 increased from 45.3 to 57.6
percent. The Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that the labor force
participation rates for men 62 and older will continue to increase
through 2024, while that of women aged 55 and older also is expected
to increase over the next decade (Toosi 2015).
The aging of the population and these increases in labor force
participation rates have resulted in a more than doubling of the number of workers aged 55 and older, from 15.5 million in 1994 to 33.9
million in 2014. Toosi (2015) reports that the proportion of the labor
force aged 55 and over rose from 11.9 percent in 1994 to 21.7 percent in 2014. The growth in the relative size of the older labor force
raised the median age of the labor force from 37.7 years in 1994 to
41.9 years in 2014. The rising share of the labor force composed of
those 55 and older was driven by both the aging of the population and
delayed retirement.12 These trends in the aging of the labor force are
expected to continue over the next decade.
Another indicator of changing retirement patterns is responses
to survey questions concerning retirement expectations. Since 1991,
Gallup has been asking workers at what age they expect to retire and
retirees the age at which they retired. Reviewing their surveys through
2014, Gallup concludes that the self-reported age of retirement has
moved “slowly upward.” According to Riffkin (2014), “Gallup con-
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ducted several polls in the early 1990s and found that the average
retirement age was 57 in both 1991 and 1993. From 2002 through
2012, the average hovered around 60. Over the past two years, the
average age at which Americans report retiring has increased to 62.”
Changing Paths to Retirement
Prior research has documented the retirement transitions of individuals in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and illustrated the
diversity of retirement choices that older Americans have made over
the past two decades. The changing paths to retirement have been
examined by Cahill, Giandrea, and Quinn (2006, 2011a, 2012, 2015)
and Giandrea, Cahill, and Quinn (2008, 2009). These studies show
the development of new transitions from career jobs to full retirement
as individuals move to bridge jobs. Maestas (2010) shows the importance of returning to work after a period of being out of the labor
force. While more than half of career employees in the HRS follow
the traditional pattern of leaving a long-term job and entirely leaving
the labor force, significant numbers of workers are choosing different
steps from work to retirement. Some are choosing phased retirement,
while others move to bridge jobs and self-employment.
The probability of each type of first transition varies by the
individual’s cohort and by the age at which the retirement transition
begins. If an individual leaves her career employer at an older age, she
is more likely to follow the traditional retirement pattern; if she leaves
at a younger age, she is more likely to take an alternative path into
retirement (Clark and Morrill 2015). The diversity of retirement paths
reflects variation in worker preferences for continued employment
and employers’ willingness to retain or hire older workers. Changes in
retirement paths highlight the need to understand why some employers are concerned with delayed retirement by career employees while
other employers are willing to hire these same workers.
Greater incidence of moving from career jobs to bridge jobs raises
the important question of whether this is due to employee preferences
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or employer constraints. Individuals could be moving to new jobs in
an effort to find lower-stress employment, shorter hours of work, or
simply a change in type of work. However, this could also be because
employers cannot or do not want to accommodate employees’ preferences for restructuring employment conditions.

DELAYED RETIREMENT: IMPACT ON EMPLOYERS
It is clear that retirement transitions for career workers are changing. At the same time, employers may be resistant to delayed retirement or to creating alternative work arrangements for older workers.
There has been too little research examining why firms may continue
to want employees to retire at the traditional retirement ages. This
analysis seeks to quantify potential cost and productivity differentials
that influence employer concerns associated with delayed retirement.
Chapter 2 examines the impact of delayed retirement on the cost and
productivity of firms and institutions. When workers delay retirement
from career jobs, the average age of employees rises. Employers must
then consider how having older workers represent a higher proportion of their workforce might impact their productivity and production costs. When the age structure of the workforce changes, this will
affect the prospects of promotion for early and midcareer workers.
These changes may, in turn, inhibit an employer’s ability to attract
and/or retain new and midcareer employees.
Chapter 2 also discusses whether different factors affect the willingness of employers to hire older workers as compared to the reluctance of career employers to accommodate later retirement. These
shifts in employers might involve changes in a worker’s occupation,
industry, hours of work, compensation, and level of responsibility. It
is important to understand why these new employers are receptive
to hiring older workers who have retired from their career employers. For example, new employers may find it easier to offer jobs with
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new working conditions, responsibilities, and wage levels that are
more suitable to older workers’ skills and preferences. In comparison,
career employers that try to modify existing terms of employment
may be accused of violating age discrimination laws. In addition, new
jobs may involve fewer hours, so employers may not have to provide
certain benefits such as pensions, health insurance, and paid leave.
Therefore, the hourly (total) compensation could be considerably
lower than is possible in career jobs.
Chapter 3 considers the special cases of phased retirement and
return-to-work employment contracts that allow older workers to
remain with their career employers but with reduced hours and perhaps at lower ranks. Such changes might involve shifts in responsibilities and hourly compensation. One important constraint in an
employer’s ability to make these adjustments is federal retirement
policies and age discrimination regulations. Do policies encourage
or limit changes in compensation and working conditions that would
result in greater use of phased retirement? An interesting observation
is that phased retirement programs are widespread in higher education and are generally viewed as good for the institution as well as
for the professor. The discussion explores why these policies are not
viewed positively by employers in general.
Chapter 4 explores the role of government policies and regulations in the cost to firms of employing older workers and the ability
of employers to modify employment contracts. Key policies include
those that affect the value of Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid,
and other programs to older persons and the retirement incentives
embedded in these programs. Potential changes in government programs such as Social Security and Medicare may increase the need for
income in retirement and thus encourage later retirement. We review
possible amendments to these plans that could reduce the employment cost of older workers and hence decrease employer concerns
about delayed retirement. State and federal age discrimination laws
are then examined to identify how these policies affect the ability of
employers to modify employment contracts to retain older workers.
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Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of the importance of considering the employer perspective on working longer. It is clear that
demographic and economic changes will continue to provide incentives for individuals to remain in the labor force until older ages. An
important question is whether employers will have the desire and
ability to provide appropriate job opportunities to accommodate the
desire for later retirement.
This book provides a comprehensive assessment of the costs and
other issues that influence an employer’s willingness to accommodate the desire of employees for delayed retirement. The analysis is
based on economic theory along with evidence on age patterns of
productivity and cost. We highlight policies and programs that could
mitigate these concerns and thus reduce employer resistance to later
retirement. The aging of the labor force and the rising proportion of
persons aged 60 and over who seek to remain active in the labor force
will provide economic and labor market pressures for employers to
consider how best to accommodate delayed retirement.
Notes
1. In the economics literature, the term bridge jobs is used to denote jobs
that older workers move to after leaving their career employers. This
new employment can be full or part time and can be in similar or different industries compared to their career jobs.
2. These changes include raising the full retirement age, which is mathematically equivalent to reducing annual benefits and increasing benefit adjustment by delaying initial claiming of Social Security benefits.
Shoven and Slavov (2014a,b) show the gain in lifetime benefits from
late claiming of Social Security benefits.
3. This same example could be used to show how longevity gains will
increase the cost to employers who provide defined benefit plans to their
workers, as more years of payouts imply greater cost to the pension
plan. The risk to the plan sponsor of rising life expectancy is one reason employers have shifted away from defined benefit plans and toward
defined contribution plans. In defined contribution plans, the worker/
retiree bears longevity risk.
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4. Most defined benefit plans in the private sector are financed solely by
employer contributions. Thus, increases in longevity, holding other plan
characteristics constant result in higher employer costs. In contrast, public sector plans typically require employee contributions, which can be
raised as plan costs increase.
5. Approximately one-quarter of all public employees are not included in the
Social Security system. As a result, they do not pay the payroll tax
that supports this plan and do not earn credits toward future retirement
benefits.
6. Originally, the full retirement age was set at 65; however, 1983 amendments increased the full retirement age to 66 for individuals born
between 1943 and 1954. The full retirement age is scheduled to increase
to age 67 for individuals born after 1960. Increases in the full retirement age are basically across the board reductions in annual benefits for
individuals claiming benefits at each age. See http://www.socialsecurity
.gov/planners/retire/agereduction.html (accessed September 1, 2016).
7. The PIA is based on the highest 35 years of wage-index annual earnings and a progressive benefit formula. The actual benefit received by a
claimant depends on the age at which benefits are claimed.
8. Munnell and Chen (2015) use a cohort analysis of the age of claiming
Social Security benefits and find that the proportion of recent cohorts
claiming benefits at age 62 has fallen to 36 percent for men and 40 percent for women.
9. The impact of claiming age on monthly benefits is nicely illustrated in
When to Start Receiving Retirement Benefits, https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/
EN-05-10147.pdf (accessed September 1, 2016).
10. Shoven and Slavov (2013) provide a detailed review of claiming options
and how delaying the start of Social Security benefits increases lifetime
benefits.
11. For the past 30 years, the National Bureau of Economic Research’s
aging program has made significant contributions to research on pensions and aging through a series of books and research papers edited by
David Wise and colleagues. Munnell and Sass (2007) also provide an
overview of the labor supply choices of older Americans.
12. Munnell and Chen (2015) examine the cohort-adjusted age of claiming
Social Security benefits and conclude that few persons reaching age 62
are starting benefits at the earliest possible age.

Chapter 2

W

Costs and Benefits of
Delayed Retirement

hen individuals seek to extend their working careers, they may
prefer to continue in their same positions and receive the same total
compensation for several additional years. As workers opt to delay
retirement, employers must consider the costs and benefits associated with having these workers remain in their positions longer.
For example, retaining workers until older ages might have adverse
effects on the prospects of promotion for midcareer workers and the
hiring of entry-level employees. On the other hand, retaining experienced workers with considerable company-specific human capital
may positively affect company operations. Older, more senior workers generally cost more in terms of higher salaries, more expensive
health insurance, and more accumulated benefits that increase with
years of service, such as paid time off or sick leave. Employers must
determine whether these additional costs are offset or exacerbated by
differences in productivity.
Having older workers represent a greater proportion of the labor
force likely imposes both costs and benefits on employers. For individuals to work longer, markets must adjust properly so that employing older workers is cost effective for firms. While individual employers might seek to implement policies that reduce the compensation of
their older workers who delay retirement, in the long run we anticipate macroeconomic changes in labor market conditions associated
with an increased supply of older workers wishing to postpone retirement. For example, an increase in old age labor supply is predicted
to lead to labor market adjustments, such as lower relative wages for
older workers.1
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PRODUCTIVITY AND EARNINGS AGE PROFILES:
IMPACT ON THE COST OF PRODUCTION
The demand for workers of different ages and/or vintages will
depend on two basic age-specific factors: compensation and productivity. Both of these factors have received considerable attention in
the economics literature. We now consider how relative compensation levels (market wages) and productivity of older workers affects
employers’ willingness to accommodate delayed or prolonged retirement transitions of career employees.
Economists have long observed that wages tend to rise with age
and job tenure but at a diminishing rate (e.g., Ben-Porath [1967];
Mincer [1974]). These observations led to the development of human
capital theory by Schultz (1963) and Becker (1964), which links
investments in education and on-the-job training to increases in productivity, which are rewarded by employers in the form of higher
wages in the postinvestment years. Becker (p. 153) writes, “Most
investments in human capital—e.g., formal education, on-the-job
training, or migration—raise observed earnings at older ages because
returns are part of earnings then, and lower them at younger ages,
because costs are deducted from earnings at that time.”
Schultz (1963) reached a similar conclusion: “Except for some
pure rent (in earnings) for differences in inherited abilities, most of
the differences in earnings are a consequence of differences in the
amounts that have been invested in people.” These early studies focus
exclusively on cash earnings and are based primarily on a spot market theory that indicates workers are paid wages equal to the value
of their productivity at each age. Thus, these theories suggest that
continued gains in earnings with age reflect rising productivity. In
other words, wages continue to equal productivity in each year so
that higher-paid older workers do not represent a higher unit cost to
employers. The model suggests that workers of different ages are substitutes but that labor costs have adjusted so that workers of all ages
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are paid according to their productivity to the firm. If spot markets are
the norm, firms have no incentive to retire older workers.
A decade later, labor economists began to focus more closely on
long-term employment relationships between workers and firms. Rather
than spot markets where wages equal productivity in every period,
these models predicted that firms might tilt the age-earnings profile
relative to the age-productivity profile so that workers were underpaid
early in their careers but then overpaid relative to their productivity in
the final years of their employment (see Lazear [1979, 1981]). The idea
is that workers essentially post a bond early in their careers and the
company repays workers with excess compensation in later working
years.2 It was argued that this arrangement reduced turnover, helped to
sort workers, and enhanced the profits of the firm. However, such contracts require an end point (i.e., retirement) where the present value of
lifetime compensation equals the present value of lifetime productivity.
Given that workers are being paid more than their productivity during
their later working years, these models provided a rationale for mandatory retirement policies and pensions that provided strong economic
incentives for workers to retire at specific ages.3
To understand the employer’s perspective on working longer,
one must first be able to measure worker productivity and its evolution over the life course. However, economists have found it difficult
to gather data that would allow for tests of the competing theories
regarding wage growth or to measure worker productivity over time.
Over 50 years ago, the Department of Labor examined productivity
and how it changes with age in various industries where output could
more easily be measured, such as manufacturing jobs and jobs with
piece-rate compensation. Munnell and Sass (2008, p. 98) review these
older studies and conclude that “productivity past age 55 in more
physically demanding tasks at best stays level but generally turns
down.” They note that job characteristics have changed considerably
over the last half century, and that research suggests older workers
do have lower levels of productivity but that the “productivity gap”
between younger and older workers has decreased.
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A series of studies provide additional evidence of the ageproductivity relationship. Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) use performance measures by supervisors as an indicator of productivity and
conclude that increases in productivity with job tenure explain only a
small component of wage gains. Using data on new hires at Fortune
1000 firms, Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992) conclude that productivity exceeds earnings for young employees but that for older workers earnings are greater than productivity. These studies support the
notion that older workers are paid more than their value to firms and,
as a result, employers have a desire to encourage older workers to
retire. If these models are correct, an increase in the age of retirement
would extend this period of overpayment and have adverse effects on
company profits. As a result, firms would tend to resist increases in
the average age of retirement of their employees in the short run. In
the long run, firms might adjust the amount of annual overpayment,
resulting in a different wage structure throughout the employment
contract.
In contrast, Hellerstein and Neumark (1995) and Hellerstein,
Neumark, and Troske (1999) find that age profiles of earnings and
productivity for older and younger workers are very similar, providing some general support for the human capital theory of earnings
growth. If their findings more accurately describe the labor market,
firms will be indifferent to the retirement patterns of workers. Thus,
employers would be more likely to accommodate the desire of some
workers for later retirement.
It is important to remember that employers in a competitive labor
market must consider both productivity and market wages in making
employment decisions. An employer seeking to determine the optimal retirement age of its workers must compare the age-productivity
profile to the age-compensation profile. Munnell and Sass (2008) recognize this point and claim that there will be a “productivity compensation deficit” as workers age if the wages of older workers do
not decline while productivity falls. As this deficit grows, employers
could try to limit employment opportunities of older workers, resist
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an increase in the retirement age, or attempt to alter wages to be in
line with productivity. In a study of the age structure of various occupations, Hirsch, Macpherson, and Hardy (2000) conclude that later
retirement ages will lead to an increase in alternative work arrangements and working conditions that will make working longer easier
for workers. However, they speculate that there will likely be “a sizable number of older workers facing constrained opportunities both
within and following their long-term career jobs” (p. 416).
One method of testing the relationship between productivity and
earnings over the life course is to observe how earnings and compensation profiles change in response to government and employer policy
shifts and changes in the demographic composition of the potential
labor force. Studies of the Japanese labor market provide some evidence on these points. Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) find that the age
earnings profiles of Japanese workers were more steeply sloped than
that for U.S. workers. Clark and Ogawa (1992a,b) update and extend
this analysis to show that as the Japanese labor force aged and the
mandatory retirement age was raised, annual compensation adjusted
and the age earnings profiles flattened with the relative increase in the
number of older workers.

COST OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS BY AGE AND TENURE
To further complicate the tests of spot market versus long-term
employment contracts, the nature of employment contracts has
changed over the past half-century, and employee benefits have risen
as a proportion of total labor costs. Defined benefit pension plans,
health insurance for active workers, and retiree health plans provide
additional back-loading to total compensation and increase the likelihood that the marginal cost of labor from older workers exceeds the
gain from their productivity.
When considering employers’ costs of employees working longer, one must pay particular attention to the total cost of compensa-

24 Clark and Morrill

tion. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2016) reports that employee
benefits account for about 30.3 percent of total compensation in the
private sector and 36.4 percent of compensation in the public sector
of the economy. Providing certain benefits to civilian workers constitutes a large fraction of employment costs, such as health insurance
(8.4 percent of total compensation), pension plans (5.1 percent of
total compensation), and paid leave (6.9 percent of total compensation). The cost of providing these benefits will typically rise with the
employees’ age and tenure.
Furthermore, defined benefit pension plans typically include economic incentives to retire at specific ages. The fact that these types of
plans were widely adopted during the mid-twentieth century provides
some evidence that long-term contracts were predominant during that
time period. However, the significant shift away from defined benefit
plans to defined contribution plans, along with the rapid decline in the
incidence of retiree health insurance provision, may signal the end of
long-term employment contracts and the resulting tilting of the compensation profile compared to the productivity profile.
Figure 2.1 shows that the proportion of workers covered by a
defined benefit plan fell from 35 percent in the early 1990s to only
18 percent in 2011. In addition, a rising proportion of defined benefit
plans are now cash balance plans, which do not have the same higher
cost for older workers that is found in traditional defined benefit plans.
Figure 2.2 indicates that defined benefit plans are more frequently
offered by large firms. It may be that compensation is being restructured to more closely reflect a spot market and that workers now have
more flexibility to postpone retirement (Friedberg and Webb 2005;
Hurd and Rohwedder 2011; Munnell, Cahill, and Jivan 2003).4 New
types of employment contracts that allow for reduced hours and compensation in later years may develop as a result of workers’ needs or
desires to work longer.
First, whether an employer self-funds health insurance or purchases it from a third party, the total cost of offering health insurance
will be a function of the size and age structure of its labor force. Hold-
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Figure 2.1  Decline of Defined Benefit Pension Plans
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ing the number of workers constant, a larger share of older workers
will imply a higher total cost of providing health insurance. Yamamoto (2013) and Alemayehu and Warner (2004) provide detailed
assessments of the relationship between age and health care costs.
These studies note that as individuals age, annual health care costs
increase substantially.5 Figure 2.3 illustrates how private health insurance spending rose between 2002 and 2010 for different age groups
using the National Health Expenditure Database. These data indicate
that not only did annual private health insurance spending rise by 5.6
percent on average between 2002 and 2010, but annual spending rose
by 7.6 percent for individuals aged 45–64 over that same time period.6
Second, the cost of defined benefit plans, relative to cash compensation, rises as workers acquire tenure and as they approach the
early and normal retirement ages in the plan. However, after a worker
passes these ages, the annual pension cost begins to fall with contin-
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Figure 2.2  Coverage by Defined Benefit Plans, by Firm Size
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ued service. Thus, while a worker faces a strong retirement incentive
from eligibility ages in the defined benefit pensions, an employer’s
cost of retaining a worker beyond normal retirement age could be
relatively lower if pension benefits do not accrue at such a high rate.7
If there is no change in the specified retirement ages in these plans,
and if individuals continue to work past the normal retirement age,
then the pension cost to employers over the lifetimes of workers who
work longer could actually decline.
Historically, economic research indicates large spikes in retirement rates around the early and normal retirement ages (Kotlikoff and
Smith 1983; Kotlikoff and Wise 1987; Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers
1990). If these incentives to retire are retained, we expect employees
to continue to retire from career jobs at normal retirement ages, even
though they would prefer to work longer. Of course, after leaving the
career job and accepting a retirement benefit, older workers may seek
to either shift to phased retirement or return to work as a contract or
part-time employee of their career employers. Chapter 3 further discusses these possibilities.
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Figure 2.3 Levels of Private Health Insurance Spending, by Age Group
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Alternatively, employers might modify their plans to accommodate a desire for later retirement and increase the normal retirement
ages specified in the plan. They might also offer incentives for working longer, such as in-service pension distributions. Such changes to
defined benefit plans could raise the benefit to employees of working
longer while increasing the cost to employers. Of course, the proportion of the labor force covered by defined benefit plans is declining.
However, many sectors of the economy, particularly the public sector,
will continue to grapple with the cost effectiveness of altering defined
benefit pension plans in order to encourage or accommodate longer
working lives.
Defined contribution plans are now the most widely used type of
retirement plan. In most cases, employers specify a fixed percent of
employee contributions that is matched by the employee. For example, an employer may match 100 percent of employee contributions
up to 6 percent of the employee’s salary. Thus, employer costs as a
percentage of salary will tend to be constant across age and tenure,
provided that employees of all tenure contribute the same percentage
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of salary. Considerable evidence indicates that younger workers are
less likely to contribute to these plans and, when enrolled, contribute a smaller percentage of their salaries. Thus, it is likely that the
actual employer cost of matching contributions still increases with
employees’ age and service. In addition, some employers have variable match rates that increase with age and tenure.
Finally, BLS (2013a) reports that paid leave is the most prevalent employee benefit provided by employers in private industry, with
84 percent of workers receiving vacation, holiday, or personal leave.
Paid holidays and paid vacations are the most common forms of paid
leave, with 72 percent of workers receiving both. In addition, 61 percent of private sector workers were covered by sick leave plans. The
cost to employers for providing paid leave in 2016 was $2.20 per
hour, equal to about 6.9 percent of total compensation (BLS 2016). If
the amount of paid leave increases with tenure, the cost to employers
of providing this benefit will rise. For example, the average number
of paid vacation days for newly hired employees is around 10 days
per year. In many companies, vacation time increases with tenure so
that after 20 years of service workers receive an average of 20 days of
paid vacation per year. Assuming a potential work year of 260 days,
vacation time for new workers would represent 3.8 percent of potential work time, while senior employees would be receiving 7.7 percent. We know of no studies that have tried to incorporate the cost of
vacation time into an analysis of the relative cost to the firm of senior
workers compared to new hires.
Including the cost of employee benefits in total compensation
implies that the age compensation profile will be steeper than the
more easily measured age earnings profile. Thus, economic studies
that have compared earnings to the value of productivity have underestimated the potential gap between pay and performance at older
ages. The larger this gap, the greater the concern of employers about
extending the normal retirement age.
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VINTAGE EFFECTS ON SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE
The previous discussion is largely based on the concept that there
is only one type of labor and that differences in productivity across
workers are due to differences in investment in human capital over
time. This implies that if older workers are more productive than
younger workers, employers could just hire additional younger workers to make up for the loss of a more productive older worker through
retirement. Alternatively, if older workers delay retirement, employers could respond by hiring fewer younger workers to maintain a constant level of productivity.
But what if older workers are actually different in their skill sets
based on years of experience and institutional knowledge? In fact,
they might be sufficiently different that the employer considers them
two distinct types of labor. For example, Levine and Mitchell (1988)
find that younger males are complements with older men, implying
that employers need to find the optimal mix of young and old workers. Thus, employers would desire to maintain a sufficient number
of older workers who provide the experience necessary for the organization to operate smoothly. Similarly, if younger workers bring a
new vintage of human capital and skills that older workers cannot
match, firms will have a strong desire to maintain an adequate level
of new hires. It may be that older workers serve as mentors to younger
workers, and that an optimal age structure for an employer has a mix
of workers with different vintages of human capital. The age structure of a firm’s labor force matters, and employers will develop their
compensation to provide economic incentives that help them attract,
retain, and retire workers in a manner that produces the optimal age
structure of their workforce.
In such a model, employers would determine the total number
of workers and the age composition of their workforces based on the
cost and productivity of each type of labor input and the complementarities between workers of different vintages. How will firms
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respond to changes in market conditions that are due to changes in the
desired retirement age or shifts in total labor supply between younger
and older workers?

PROMOTION AND TIME IN GRADE
If an employer accommodates the desire for later retirement
ages, and if there is no change in the demand for its product, then
an employer might have to reduce the rate of new hiring. As a result,
the firm’s labor force would become older. Delayed retirement may
reduce promotional opportunities and thus increase time in grade
for younger workers. The option of later retirement might appeal
to current older workers, but how will younger workers and potential new hires feel about having to spend more years in lower-level
jobs? Slower promotion may make employment in firms with higher
retirement ages less appealing to younger workers, which implies that
employers should consider the impact of later retirement on their current and future labor force.
Previous research has relied on demographic models of population
aging to understand how later retirement and lower rates of retirement
affect the advancement of younger workers. In early work using population life tables, Keyfitz (1973) develops a demographic model that
illustrates how lower rates of population growth, and hence the aging
of the population, would slow the rate of mobility up the employment
hierarchy.8 He uses the same model to illustrate the impact of labor
force growth on individuals’ advancement to higher-paying jobs and
management positions. This model has been extended to further illustrate the impact of population aging, the elimination of mandatory
retirement, and the resulting increase in the labor force participation
rate of older persons on the prospects of promotion for younger workers (see Cantrell and Clark [1980, 1982]; Clark and Cantrell [1986];
Clark and Ghent [2010]). These papers indicate how the extension
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of work life implies that more years of service are required before a
person reaches any given rank in the employment hierarchy.
Clark and Cantrell (1986) expand the model of promotion by
focusing on a single industry and show how changes in personnel
and compensation policies might affect exit rates and hence the age
structure of the academic labor market. They derive how these alternative futures affect promotional prospects and the age at which various ranks are attained. These studies all suggest that if older workers delay retirement, the age structure of the labor force will become
older and there will be fewer promotion opportunities for younger
employees. Thus, delayed retirement implies delayed promotion and
more years of service to attain each rank in the job hierarchy.
However, the decline in upward mobility can be moderated if
older workers do not remain in top jobs as they extend their working
careers. This can be accomplished through reductions in job responsibilities or by older workers entering phased retirement. As discussed
in Chapter 3, phased retirement provides new opportunities to older
workers to keep working at reduced levels and tempers the impact on
the promotion prospects for younger workers. Furthermore, a firm
may adjust hiring or career structures to accommodate longer working lives and some period of reduced responsibility and time commitment during later employment years.

SUMMARY OF EMPLOYERS’ CONCERNS ABOUT
DELAYED RETIREMENT
The relationship between compensation and productivity, and
the function of how these factors change as workers age, are central to the willingness of employers to facilitate older-age retirement.
Compensation is generally observable, although it requires a complete accounting for the total cost of employment, including benefits.
However, employee productivity is more difficult to measure. It may
also be difficult to link productivity to individual workers if there are
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complementarities between workers of different vintages of human
capital. We do know that annual earnings and the average cost of
benefits rise with age. If productivity increases at a slower rate (or
even declines) with age, employers will note that they tend to overpay
older workers on an annual basis and thus will not want to extend
their employees’ working lives. Because of a lack of quantifiable data
on employee productivity, relatively few studies have attempted to
directly compare and contrast life-cycle patterns of compensation and
productivity. Some notable exceptions can be found in the literature
on the economics of education, where productivity is approximated by
student test score gains (e.g., Wiswall [2013] and references therein).
Not only is it difficult to measure the productivity of individuals,
but we expect there to be complementarities between workers as well.
In most settings, employees do not work in isolation. It may be that
they work as a team, but complementarities can even be seen in environments where there is no teamwork but peer effects alter behavior. For example, Mas and Moretti (2009) find positive productivity
spillovers from a highly productive cashier in a large supermarket
chain. Fitzpatrick and Lovenheim (2014) find that early retirement
incentives caused older teachers to retire earlier. Even though the
most experienced teachers left, the authors find little effect on student
outcomes. In addition to our wanting to understand how individuals’
productivity varies over the life cycle, it would also be useful to measure how retirements affect the workers left behind.
Of course, employers make productivity and compensation comparisons all the time. This occurs in annual performance reviews and
merit raises. It is important to remember that the issue in question
is not whether an individual older worker remains productive but
whether her current (and future) level of productivity is sufficient
to justify her current (and future) salary if her work life is suddenly
extended. If employers believe that compensation exceeds productivity, and that the difference is likely to increase if retirement is delayed,
then company leaders will desire to retain policies that encourage
retirement at the traditional retirement ages. If workers are to be given
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the opportunity to remain in their career jobs, the focus must be on
whether firms can adjust their employment and compensation policies
so that, on average, workers have the option to delay retirement. Furthermore, delaying retirement will alter the age structure of the labor
force, the stock of human capital and skills, the rate of promotion of
younger workers, and the ability to hire younger employees.

DIFFERENCES ACROSS THE ECONOMY
This chapter identifies important economic factors that influence
the willingness of employers to retain older workers past the normal retirement age. For some firms, these concerns will be dominant
and will seek to provide incentives for older workers to retire in a
traditional fashion at the specified retirement ages. For others, the
costs will be less important, and their retention policies may be very
different. The analysis identifies some employment and compensation characteristics that should lead to labor market sorting into jobs
where older workers are a significant proportion of the workforce.
The sectors employing older workers could either be attracting and
hiring new workers (as in bridge jobs) or retaining career workers
for a longer span. Industries in which compensation packages tend
not to include retirement plans, health insurance benefits, and paid
time off likely would see a larger fraction of older workers. Similarly,
firms with a less steep employment hierarchy with fewer promotional
opportunities, and where specific human capital is less important,
may be more open to retaining older workers.
Firms with performance-based pay that more closely matches
the spot market system will be more likely to retain older workers,
because productivity declines would be matched with compensation declines. In addition, firms that rely more heavily on merit pay,
where annual earnings are directly related to annual performance,
will be less concerned with productivity declines with age. Studies
by Hutchens (1986, 1988) in the United States and Heywood, Jirjahn,
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and Tsertsvardze (2010) in Germany highlight the impact of firm compensation policies on retaining older employees as opposed to hiring
new older workers. Back-loading of compensation as part of implicit
contracts results in lower turnover rates of older career employees,
but it makes firms more reluctant to hire older individuals because of
their higher labor costs.
Even within firms, we expect to see that some occupations allow
for more job flexibility and have working conditions that are able
to accommodate the needs of older workers. Cahill, Giandrea, and
Quinn (2011b) find that older workers tend to seek jobs with fewer
hours of work, often through a late career job change that is part of a
retirement transition. Hirsch, Macpherson, and Hardy (2000, p. 407)
provide a detailed assessment of the occupations for which older men
and women are most likely to be able to remain on the job. Older
men tend to have more employment opportunities in occupations
requiring “few physical demands, flexible hours and schedules, and,
for the most part, low skill and training requirements,” while women
are most likely to be found as “household workers, welfare service
aides, religious workers, and crossing guards.” Hirsch, Macpherson,
and Hardy also find that jobs requiring evening and night shift work
are less likely to employ or hire older women, while flexible working hours had a positive impact on female employment. However,
these requirements do not seem to be related to male employment
opportunities. The authors also document that more rapidly rising age
earnings profiles tend to reduce employment opportunities for older
workers. Their analysis clearly shows the differences associated with
retaining older workers who delay retirement versus hiring new older
workers in bridge employment.
In summary, the importance of skills and preferences of employees, along with job characteristics and compensation policies, influence whether firms think their career workers become costlier as
retirement is delayed. This impact varies substantially across firms
throughout the economy. These same factors determine the willingness of firms to hire older workers.
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Notes
1. Clark and Ogawa (1992a) show that when the age of mandatory retirement in Japan was increased from 55 to 60, the relative wages of older
workers declined. The flattening of the age earnings profiles reduced the
employers’ costs of adjusting their employment contracts as the proportion of older workers in their labor force increased (Matsukura, Ogawa,
and Clark 2007).
2. The “bond” is the difference between the value of the workers’ productivity (implicitly, their opportunity wage at other firms) and their wages
early in their careers.
3. Hutchens (1989) and Skirbekk (2008) provide nice summaries of the
alternative theories explaining the growth of earnings with age and
review the evidence on how productivity changes with age. Also see
Bloom and Sousa-Poza (2013).
4. Greater worker mobility may indicate that workers are now less interested in a long-term relationship with a single employer. More frequent layoffs and plant closings also provide a signal to employees that
employers may renege on such contracts.
5. The Kaiser Family Foundation and the Health Research and Educational
Trust (2015) report on employer-provided health plans illustrates the
proportion of the workforce covered by health plans and the rising cost
of these plans over time.
6. Data are from http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and
-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/
Downloads/2010GenderandAgeTables.pdf (accessed December 2015).
7. This lower cost to the employer is the other side of the decline in the
growth rate of the pension wealth of older workers as they remain on the
job past the early and normal retirement ages.
8. Keyfitz (1973) was primarily interested in showing the impact of population on labor force advancement through the employment hierarchy.
He defines rank as the ratio of the number of workers above a person to
the number of workers below him. His base model assumes that everyone is hired at the same age, that there is a fixed relationship between
supervisors and lower-tier employees, that all workers move at the same
rate through the job hierarchy, and that there is a fixed retirement age.
Turnover and retirement rates speed the movement up the job hierarchy.
Clark and Cantrell (1986) use work life tables instead of life tables to
examine similar changes.

Chapter 3

Alternative Late Career
Employment Arrangements

A
s individuals age, they may wish to continue paid employment
but with reduced hours or responsibilities. Employers that are inter-

ested in retaining older workers might offer a contract, either formal or
informal, whereby select older workers continue their career employment but with reduced hours or in a new position. The employee
might be offered lower compensation or reduced responsibilities but
also more flexibility, different working conditions, and fewer work
hours. This transition could entail a shift in job assignments, or the
employee could continue doing the same tasks but only work a part of
the day, fewer days per week, or full time for part of the year. Defined
this way, phased retirement could be considered a form of job sharing,
as employers use phased retirees to staff their labor force needs. Similarly, individuals might return to work after claiming a pension with
a break in service. This chapter examines the conditions that influence employers’ ability and willingness to adopt policies that allow
for alternative late-career employment arrangements beyond simply
postponing retirement. Both employers and employees might benefit
from a continuing employment arrangement, given a built-up stock of
employer-specific human capital. However, programs such as phased
retirement or return to work may prove difficult to implement because
of pension regulations and concerns over age discrimination.
THE EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVE OF
PHASED RETIREMENT
There are relatively few broad-based phased retirement programs
in the private sector. Furthermore, many employers seem uninterested
in including such a program as part of their future human resource
policies (McGill et al. 2010).
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Employers develop phased retirement plans to achieve certain
human resource objectives. Of course, the success of these policies
hinges on whether older workers will want to enroll in the phased
retirement plan, given the employment terms, wage levels, and benefits that are offered. Employers can make these plans relatively
cost neutral (half-time pay for half-time effort) or they can provide
incentives to encourage older workers to move into phased retirement (three-quarters pay for half-time work). Phased retirement plans
usually specify a predetermined departure date that ends the employer’s commitment to providing phased retirement to the individual
employee. An important factor is whether retirees that are in phased
retirement continue to receive benefits, especially health insurance.
Another major aspect of phased programs is how the nature of
job assignments changes as older workers move into phased retirement. Phased retirement plans may be general in nature and cover all
employees or can be used on an individual basis in an effort to retain
certain employees. Hutchens and Papps (2004) and Rappaport (2001)
both report that employers tend to favor informal phased retirement
programs that allow employers to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether older workers will be given the option of phased retirement.
The decision to adopt a phased retirement program is linked to
many of the same issues discussed earlier regarding employer reactions to delayed retirement. In some cases, firms may want to retain
older workers and the skills and experience they have acquired.
Facing increased retirements associated with aging baby boomers,
these employers may find that phased retirement encourages older
workers to remain on the job and provides the level of institutional
knowledge necessary for high levels of productivity for all workers.
Other employers may believe that they have achieved the optimal age
structure of their labor force and will be less willing to offer phased
retirement for cost and productivity reasons. Thus, a key factor in the
decision to adopt phased retirement plans is whether employers think
it will encourage high-value workers to leave full-time employment
sooner than they would without this option. Alternatively, eligible

Alternative Late Career Employment Arrangements 39

employees could tack on additional years of phased retirement to the
previously planned age of full retirement rather than simply retiring
earlier than planned.
Gustman and Steinmeier (2008) develop a simulation model for
workers choosing between full-time employment, phased retirement,
and complete retirement. Their analysis indicates that if all employers adopted plans that allowed workers to enter phased retirement at
their current hourly wages, there would be a substantial increase in
phased retirement and a somewhat smaller reduction in full retirement. Employers must also consider whether phased retirement might
appear to be a legal method to encourage less-productive workers
to retire more quickly from full-time employment and enter phased
retirement.
Hutchens and Grace-Martin (2006) consider three hypotheses for
why firms differ in their preferences for phased retirement policies.
They focus on minimum hours constraints, employee demand, and
the presence of defined benefit pension plans. Building on the earlier
work of Gustman and Steinmeier (1983), the authors develop a simple model of a profit-maximizing firm and posit that firms that impose
a minimum hours constraint on all employees are less likely to have
adopted phased retirement policies. The underlying theory behind
this relationship is the production technology and the need for teamwork, whereby part-time employees or “substitute” workers might
reduce the productivity of the team. They note that if employees have
a preference for phased retirement and are willing to accept lower
wages to have it, then firms are more likely to offer this benefit as
part of the employment contract with a compensating differential of
lower wages. Individuals who prefer having the option to phase into
retirement might then cluster together in firms that offer this benefit.
Surveys of employers indicate that relatively few companies
have adopted formal phased retirement programs. For example, Rappaport (2001) reports that a survey by William Mercer finds that less
than one-quarter of employers surveyed had adopted formal phased
retirement programs. Two surveys of older workers by Watson Wyatt
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Worldwide (1999, 2004) indicate that there may be some increase in
the incidence of phased retirement plans. The first survey finds that
only 16 percent of large employers offered any type of phased retirement, while the latter survey reports that 40 percent of employers had
policies allowing employees to phase into retirement on their current jobs. The 2004 report concludes that phasing will likely become
increasingly prevalent as the baby boomers enter their retirement
years. One should keep in mind that these surveys are small in scale
and are not representative of the entire labor market.

REGULATORY FRICTIONS
The lack of interest by employers in establishing phased retirement programs may be due to legal and regulatory policies associated with retirement plans, tax policies, and age discrimination laws.
McGill et al. (2010, Chapter 8) provide a detailed account of federal policies that impact the payment of a retirement benefit from a
defined benefit plan and how they have evolved over the past decade.
Hutchens and Grace-Martin (2006) note that defined benefit pension plans may be an obstacle to phased retirement because of the
relationship between final salary and retirement benefits. If phased
retirees continue to be covered by a defined benefit plan, and phased
years and the salary earned during these years are used to calculate
retirement benefits, then annual benefits could be lowered by the
individual’s having spent time in phased retirement.1 Obviously, this
would make phased retirement less desirable. In contrast, participation in defined contribution plans can determine the date a worker
initiates withdrawals and begins to draw down retirement wealth.
Delaying the start of the draw-down from a defined contribution plan
increases the potential annual annuity that ultimately can be paid.2
IRS tax law prohibits individuals from working full time in a
position covered by a defined benefit pension while also receiving
a benefit from that same plan except under certain circumstances, as
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modified by the Pension Protection Act. If a worker is incentivized
to retire at a specific age because of the pension structure, it may be
appealing to enter into a new type of employment contract with the
career employer. For example, a worker could become a contractor. In
this case, rather than a formal phased retirement program, there may
be indirect channels of returning to work.
To investigate the role of minimum hours and pension policies
in the adoption of phased retirement programs, Hutchens and GraceMartin (2006) examine a sample of 950 establishments (not in agriculture or mining) with 20 or more employees. Their empirical results
indicate that minimum hours constraints are important to consider and
also suggest that the existence of defined benefit pension plans make
phased retirement policies less likely. However, they find no evidence
that employee preferences increase the likelihood of being covered
by phased retirement policies. Significant differences in the incidence
of phased retirement policies are found across occupations, and larger
firms are more likely to have established phased retirement policies
than smaller firms. Employer interviews also indicate that firms often
have informal policies that allow some employees to shift to part-time
employment at the end of their working careers.

PHASED RETIREMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION
One sector of the economy that seems particularly well suited for
phased retirement is higher education. Conley (2007) reports results
from a survey conducted by the American Association of American
University Presses that indicate 32 percent of universities had formal
phased retirement programs. Allen (2005) describes the advantages to
universities of offering phased retirement and reviews the incidence of
these plans in higher education.3 He concludes that phased retirement
can be a win-win in higher education. Workloads of career faculty are
relatively easy to divide (e.g., teaching courses during one semester
and then not working one semester). Universities gain from phased
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retirement because career faculty members are typically required to
give up tenure in exchange for a reduced workload. In many plans,
the program is relatively cost neutral, as the cost of two phased retirees is similar to the cost of one full-time professor. Faculty gain from
phased retirement since they are allowed to gradually disengage from
the university. During phased retirement, faculty may actually have
higher total income than when they worked full time, depending on
their utilization of pension and Social Security income combined with
their half-time salary from the university.
Allen, Clark, and Ghent (2004) examine the impact of a phased
retirement system adopted by the University of North Carolina (UNC)
system of 16 campuses.4 The UNC program required faculty to relinquish tenure and sign a three-year contract that provided 50 percent of
preretirement pay for 50 percent effort, followed by complete retirement. Prior to the introduction of this program, the retirement rate of
faculty 50 and older was 8.7 percent. After the plan was introduced,
the total retirement rate (full plus phased retirement) increased to
about 10.5 percent in the first three years of the program. About 30
percent of total retirements were faculty entering the phased retirement program. The authors conclude, “On balance, the introduction
of phased retirement in the UNC system seems to have been beneficial from both employee and employer perspectives” (p. 124).5

AGE DISCRIMINATION LAWS
To protect older workers from employer discrimination, federal
and state laws prohibit the use of a worker’s age in making an employment decision (hiring, promotion, compensation, and retention). The
1968 Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) made discrimination against workers aged 40–65 illegal. Since the upper age
was capped at 65, employers could continue to impose mandatory
retirement at age 65 or above. In 1978, the ADEA was amended to
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cover workers up to age 70. To comply, firms had to either eliminate
their mandatory retirement policies or raise the age to 70. The ADEA
was amended once again in 1986 to prohibit discrimination against
all workers aged 40 and over, thus effectively eliminating the use of
mandatory retirement and other age-based policies, except in certain
sectors of the economy and among certain highly paid employees.
Although ending mandatory retirement seems like a benefit for
older workers, it may have had unintended consequences. For example, Lahey (2008) finds that employers reacted to age discrimination
policies by reducing older worker employment.
In addition to ending mandatory retirement, the ADEA requires
firms to modify other employment policies that might adversely affect
older workers. Thus, employers may worry about the legal implications associated with phased retirement policies that reduce hourly
wages and result in lower-status jobs. Furthermore, employers may
believe that they need to treat all workers equally when adjusting
wages or providing alternative end-of-career work arrangements (see
Neumark [2009] for a detailed discussion). They may be concerned
that any modifications in job titles, responsibilities, and compensation
that would make older workers more attractive to retain would be
considered age discriminatory. Thus, not all employers would consider adopting some of the adjustments discussed in this review.
For the most part, research on age discrimination has focused on
the impact of laws that mandate that firms treat older workers equally
in hiring, training, and compensation. While most research indicates
that the opportunities of older workers have improved, some studies
suggest that firms are more reluctant to hire older workers because
of the stronger legal protections (e.g., Lahey [2008]; Neumark and
Button [2014]). It is possible that these laws restrict employers from
developing policies that accommodate the preferences of older workers if it means giving up status and employee benefits.
More research is needed to evaluate whether government policies permit career employers to modify working conditions of older
workers without violating their rights or leaving them vulnerable to
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discrimination. Phased retirement could become an important component of the retirement transition by allowing productive workers
to remain with their career employers while compensation and working conditions are modified. Federal and state governments should
examine whether age discrimination laws, tax policies, and pension
regulations should be modified to remove restrictions that limit the
use of phased retirement programs.

WILL PHASED RETIREMENT BE AN IMPORTANT
RETIREMENT PATH IN THE FUTURE?
Economic studies and data analyses indicate that a large proportion of career employees would like the option of phasing into retirement on their current jobs. However, many of the studies of individual
responses to the availability of phased retirement are dated, and most
use survey responses from the Health and Retirement Study. Much
has changed for older persons in the labor market in the past three
decades. The trend toward early retirement has been reversed, and
labor force participation rates of older workers have increased. Future
research should address two key questions. First, how has delayed
retirement from full-time career jobs affected the demand for phased
retirement? Clark and Morrill (2015) find that individuals leaving
career jobs in their fifties are more likely to enter phased retirement
or bridge jobs than retirees in their sixties. Second, how has the
continued decline in the coverage of defined benefit plans affected
retirement transitions? Participants in defined contribution plans may
find that phased retirement is less beneficial to them since they have
greater control of the utilization of their retirement wealth.
The U.S. Department of Labor (2008) held hearings on the
demand for phased retirement by employees and the barriers that
inhibit employers from establishing phased retirement programs.
Johnson (2011) discusses how age discrimination laws and pension
regulations interact to restrict the adoption of phased retirement plans
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(see also Fields and Hutchens [2002]). Recent changes in federal
legislation to allow in-service distribution of pension benefits after
employees have attained the normal retirement age have moderated a
significant impediment to phased retirement. Limited evidence indicates that the incidence of phased retirement varies across employers
and sectors of the economy, due in part to production techniques and
the divisibility of job tasks. Hill (2010) discusses these legal barriers, as well as company-specific characteristics that restrict or limit
employers’ ability to adopt phased retirement plans, such as the types
of jobs, the organizational structure of the firm, and the characteristics
of employees.
Interestingly, the federal government has recently adopted a
phased retirement program for its own workforce and issued basic
guidelines governing which federal workers are eligible and what
terms of employment are acceptable. Employees who meet the eligibility requirements may continue working on a part-time basis
with the agreement of their agencies. These phased retirees can
receive a partial retirement benefit and will continue to accrue service credits that will be used in the determination of their ultimate
retirement benefit. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidelines state that phased retirees must spend 20 percent of their time
mentoring younger employees. OPM Director Katherine Archuleta
states, “Phased retirement offers an innovative alternative to traditional retirement for the twenty-first century workforce. It provides
a new tool that allows managers to better provide unique mentoring
opportunities for employees, while increasing access to the decades
of institutional knowledge and experience that retirees can provide”
(McGuinness 2014).6

RETURNING TO WORK AFTER RETIREMENT
An alternative to formal phased retirement programs is for older
workers to return to their previous employers in a new role, often
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after a period of nonemployment. When an employee is covered
by a defined benefit plan, in most cases she will find that continued
employment past normal retirement age carries a large opportunity
cost. However, perhaps she (and her employer) would prefer to continue the relationship. IRS rules stipulate that an individual must separate from employment for a period of time and may return to work
only in a position not covered by the pension from which the individual is actively receiving a benefit. Pension benefits can be suspended
and covered work resumed at any point. Uncovered employment can
typically be structured as contract work, whereby a worker is either
self-employed or employed by an agency that leases their services
to the career employer. This work could be flexible and part time or
could be full time, but it must not be in a position that is covered by
the defined benefit pension plan. An employer might value this type
of arrangement since these contract-type positions likely do not carry
the same job protections and restrictions.
An alternative arrangement can be reached if a worker terminates employment and requests a lump sum distribution of the
defined benefit pension. In the private sector, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 guidelines stipulate that any plan
that offers a lump sum option must calculate that amount using an
actuarially equivalent formula. In the public sector, the lump sum
option is generally calculated as the sum of employee contributions
and is typically much lower than the present discounted value of the
potential annuity for career workers (see the discussion in Clark,
Morrill, and Vanderweide [2014]). In practice, it may be difficult for
employers to navigate the complex tax rules associated with these
work-after-retirement work-arounds. Maestas (2010, p. 726) writes,
“Although the Pension Protection Act [2006] established the legality
of in-service pension payments under certain circumstances, it is not
yet clear to what extent employers will make this option available.”
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EMPLOYER OPTIONS TO ACCOMMODATE
DELAYED RETIREMENT
This chapter has highlighted several potential barriers to an
employer accommodating workers’ desires to work longer. Age discrimination laws may hinder an employer’s ability to adjust compensation to reflect productivity changes as workers age. It might also be
that conventions regarding wage growth inhibit an employers’ ability
to adjust compensation downward. The typical structure of benefits
may also be a problem. We speculate that employers may want to
accommodate workers’ desires to work longer but might encounter
legal or cultural obstacles along the way. This might explain why
some workers transition to bridge jobs rather than enter phased retirement at a career employer.
As the workforce ages, we may see an increase in both phased
retirement and return-to-work programs. This is particularly true
among employers offering workers defined benefit plans, because
these plans are designed to incentivize retirements at certain ages. If
the employer seeks to retain talent at ages above their defined benefit
plans’ normal retirement age, this can be achieved through the development of programs that allow for a continued relationship while not
violating IRS and federal and state regulations of pension plans.
Notes
1. Most defined benefit pension plans have an earnings-based formula that
is the multiple of a generosity parameter, total years of service (earned
plus purchased), and a final average salary (FAS) value, which is often
based on the average salary during the individual’s final few years of
service. If phased years are included in calculating FAS, monthly retirement benefits will be lower. However, if phased retirees are not included
in the retirement plan, then FAS would be based on prephased years (or
the top few years of earnings, especially if the earnings were indexed)
and the retirement benefit would be unaffected.
2. Allowing phased retirees to begin to receive their pension benefits while
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3.
4.
5.

6.

in phased retirement would mean that the retiree would be receiving the
full retirement benefit along with the salary for phased retirement.
Leslie and Janson (2005) also examine the value of phased retirement
from the perspective of the university.
Switkes (2005) describes the introduction of a phased retirement plan in
the University of California system.
Ghent, Allen, and Clark (2001) provide additional analysis of the introduction of this phased retirement plan. Interestingly, they find that faculty who are enrolled in the state defined benefit plan are more likely
to enter phased retirement than those who elected to participate in a
defined contribution plan. This reflects two parameters of the program:
1) the requirement that faculty retire before entering the plan, and 2) the
stipulation that in phased retirement they will no longer accrue retirement benefits.
For detailed guidelines of the phased retirement program, see https://
www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/08/08/2014-18681/phased
-retirement (accessed December 2015).

Chapter 4

The Role of Public Policies

Federal policies on retirement and age discrimination influence

workers’ decisions on whether to retire at later ages. These same
policies affect employers’ willingness to retain older workers. This
chapter reviews some of the key elements of national work and retirement policies. Potential changes could remove some of the labor costs
and legal constraints that limit employers’ willingness to retain older
workers past traditional retirement ages. Labor market regulations
that aim to protect older workers from age discrimination may hinder the ability of workers and firms to renegotiate contract terms that
would make older workers more valuable.
While individuals might want to work longer as life expectancy
increases, the opportunities for continued employment depend on the
actions of government and employers. The willingness of firms to
retain individuals until older ages is affected by a series of public
programs and policies. In this chapter, we consider possible changes
in Social Security and Medicare, and we discuss age discrimination
policies that directly affect the cost and benefit of modifying working conditions in a manner that will reduce the incentives that may
prompt workers to retire.
SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE REFORMS TO
PROMOTE DELAYED RETIREMENT
Pay-as-you-go old age pensions or health insurance programs
(e.g., Social Security and Medicare in the United States) require an
adequate ratio of workers to claimants to remain solvent. Thus, governments offering such programs must design public policies that
incentivize shorter periods of time spent in retirement and longer
periods of time spent paying into the systems. For example, Butrica,
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Smith, and Steuerle (2006) estimate that the U.S. government would
raise $180 billion in additional tax revenue by 2045 if all workers
delayed retirement by one year. As the average age of the population
rises and the cost of national entitlement programs increase, government has attempted to encourage later retirement through higher ages
of eligibility and lower benefits in such programs as Social Security.1
Delayed retirement should reduce the cost of national retirement programs and help maintain per capita GDP in an aging society.2 Given
the current financial plight of Social Security, it is likely that there
will be fundamental changes in the payroll tax and benefit formula
over the next two decades.3
Fifty years ago, when Medicare was established, the average age
of retirement was 65, which was the age of eligibility for both Medicare and Social Security. Significant increases in life expectancy since
then have substantially increased the cost of these programs. Medicare faces a long-run financing deficit, and the trust fund is projected
to be depleted in 2030.4 While the normal retirement age to qualify for
Social Security benefits has increased to age 66, the age of eligibility
for Medicare for the nondisabled has remained at 65. Increasing the
age of eligibility for government health insurance should also encourage later retirement.
If the government were to increase the ages of eligibility for
Social Security and Medicare, how would employers respond? If a
firm has designed an optimal compensation scheme to attract, retain,
and retire workers, then firms might seek to offset changes in national
retirement programs that encourage delayed retirement by adjusting age-specific compensation (if allowed by law) or by increasing
the retirement incentives in their own compensation packages. For
example, if the normal retirement age of Social Security were raised
to 70, employers could adjust their own retirement policies to target age 70 as the expected or normal retirement age. In other words,
retirement plans could be restructured so that working to age 70 is
necessary to provide an adequate retirement income. Of course, this
implies that employers are willing to accept the higher retirement
age. Interestingly, increases in the normal retirement ages specified
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in pension plans would imply more years of work for employers and
employees to accumulate sufficient resources to provide an adequate
annual retirement income for the fewer number of years in retirement.
An employer increasing the normal retirement age in its pension plan
while holding the target replacement rate constant would moderate
the higher cost of retaining older workers.
On the other hand, if employers have concerns about a higher
retirement age for their workers, they could modify their own retirement plans to offset the changes in Social Security so that workers continue to retire at the age the company deems optimal. Such
a response highlights the difference between worker preference for
later retirement and job opportunities with firms concerned about the
cost and productivity of older workers. Employers would be more
willing to extend work life if compensation, costs, and working conditions are altered (see Henkens and van Dalen [2011] and references therein), which could reduce labor market rigidities that hinder
employees from reducing hours worked or otherwise transitioning
into retirement (Hurd 1996).
Once Medicare was enacted, many employers agreed to extend
health insurance to workers retiring by age 65. Retiree health insurance can be considered an early retirement incentive—if retirees need
to purchase health insurance until they are eligible for Medicare, this
could be cost prohibitive, as the annual cost of health insurance for
a married couple in their fifties or early sixties can be substantial.
Employer-provided health insurance for retirees until they reach age
65 can be an important incentive to retire prior to reaching age 65.
Fitzpatrick (2014) shows how retiree health insurance for public
school employees enhances the retirement incentives embedded in
the defined benefit pension plan. The decline in coverage by defined
benefit plans and the sharp drop in the proportion of firms providing
retiree health insurance have altered the incentives for early retirement. This is one of the reasons for the increase in labor force participation among older persons. Retiring after age 65 makes these plans
less important to individuals as they plan the retirement transition.
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One policy change that would encourage individuals to continue
working and employers to be more receptive to delayed retirement
would be to eliminate Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes for
both the employer and employee for all workers who have reached
the age of eligibility for these programs. Such a change would
acknowledge that these older workers had “paid up” their policies
and were eligible for benefits. They would receive the equivalent of
an increase in take-home pay of 7.65 percent, holding gross earnings constant. This wage increase should further encourage delayed
retirement. At the same time, the absolute and relative cost to the
employer of maintaining older workers would decline by a similar
amount. The elimination of employer payroll taxes on older workers would increase the demand for these workers and likely result in
more employment opportunities for older workers to remain in the
labor force. Of course, the loss of this revenue would undermine the
attempts to shore up these social insurance programs by encouraging
later claiming ages.

PUBLIC POLICIES CONCERNING MODIFICATION OF
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
The evidence indicates that many workers prefer a gradual transition into retirement. Currently, the most frequent method of achieving this shift in employment status is to retire from a career employer
and move to a bridge job. In general, the hourly wage in bridge jobs is
much lower than compensation in the old job. Would it be more efficient for workers to negotiate new working conditions and compensation with their career employer rather than incur search costs and
move to lower-paying employment? Earlier, we showed that employers may be reluctant to adopt phased retirement or return-to-work
programs. They may fear being sued for age discrimination if wages
and status are reduced. In addition, defined benefit pension regulations may inhibit individuals from working while claiming benefits.
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Employers would also be more likely to enact phased retirement or
return-to-work policies if the offer of continued employment can be
restricted to targeted workers, such as those in hard-to-replace jobs or
only workers with high levels of performance.
More work is needed to determine whether state and federal policies, such as age discrimination rules, affect end-of-career decisions
by both firms and workers. Certain types of employment and compensation restructuring toward the end of careers clearly would be in the
interest of at least some workers and firms. The reluctance of employers to adopt these policies is due in part to uncertainty about how they
will be viewed by regulators and the courts. Removing this concern
should increase the incidence of phased retirement programs throughout the economy, although potentially at the cost of removing needed
employment protections for older workers. In addition, even if policies were modified, it would certainly not be the case that all firms
move quickly to adopt phased retirement programs. As highlighted
in Chapter 2, real cost and productivity issues would likely remain.
If offered the choice, would individuals prefer redefined employment with their career employer to a new job? The answer to this
question depends on the preferences of workers and the types of new
working conditions they might prefer in the final working years.
Those who are seeking new challenges and second careers may still
want to shift to new occupations in different industries; however, for
many, it is likely that reduced search costs and a familiar working
environment will be the optimal path for the transition into retirement.

IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICIES ON EMPLOYERS, AND
THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT DELAYED RETIREMENT
National economic policies can influence the rate of growth of
the economy and hence the aggregate demand for labor. A faster rate
of growth leads to greater increases in the demand for workers. In a
growing economy, hiring new workers becomes more difficult, and
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firms will be more willing to retain older workers and allow the average age of retirement to rise. Alternatively, a more slowly growing
economy creates an environment in which firms seek to encourage
older workers to leave at earlier ages. Thus, macroeconomic policies
that promote growth are consistent with delayed retirement.
Some policies, programs, and regulations directly affect the cost
of hiring and retaining workers. To the extent that these policies
increase the cost of employing older rather than younger workers,
employers will resist extending the work life of their career employees. With an increase in average life expectancy, the need for delayed
retirement becomes more important. A comprehensive assessment
is needed of the impact of these various programs on the demand
for older workers and whether policies raise hurdles as firms seek to
respond to their employees’ desire for later retirement and modified
working conditions in their final working years. The history of firm
compensation policy indicates that employers do respond to changes
in government policies that affect costs. Policies that reduce the relative cost of employing older workers or that remove constraints that
limit modifications of working conditions should increase opportunities for older workers to remain in their career jobs.
Notes
1. Changes have included those made by the 1983 Greenspan Commission,
which raised the age for full benefits, instituted changes in the earnings
test, and delayed retirement credits (Schieber and Shoven 1999).
2. Clark et al. (2008) illustrate the impact of delayed retirement and higher
labor force participation rates for older men and women on the future
growth rate of the Japanese economy.
3. The annual report of the Social Security Trustees (2014) indicates that
the projected 75-year deficit of the OASDI program is 2.88 percent of
taxable earnings and that the OASDI trust fund will be exhausted in
2033.
4. See http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/TRSUM/index.html (accessed
August 24, 2016).

Chapter 5

The Future of Working Longer

A
ny assessment of labor market trends must include a careful analysis of employer interests associated with the size and age distribution of

their workforces. Over the past 50 years, firms have dramatically altered
their compensation policies in response to changing government policies and labor market conditions. The development of defined benefit
pension plans, increases in these plans’ generosity, and the adoption of
early retirement incentives allowed employers to achieve an orderly
retirement around the desired ages of retirement. The introduction of
retiree health insurance programs following the enactment of Medicare
also provided incentives for many individuals to retire prior to age 65,
when they would become eligible for Medicare.
Many of these changes were introduced in the 1960s and 1970s,
when baby boomers began entering the labor force. In response to the
increased supply of younger, cheaper, and better-educated workers,
firms adopted new retirement policies that offered older workers the
opportunity to retire. An aging population and rising life expectancy,
along with modifications in government policies and programs, substantially increased the cost to employers of providing these benefits.
Firms have responded by shifting from defined benefit retirement
plans to defined contribution plans, which lack the same early retirement incentives. The sharp decline in coverage by retiree health plans
has made early retirement more expensive for workers. Thus, these
changes in employers’ policies have exacerbated the need for older
workers to remain in the labor force. The key question for the future
is, how will employers respond to the increasing desire of workers to
remain on the job past age 65?
MODIFYING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS TO
ACCOMMODATE DELAYED RETIREMENT
Throughout most of the twentieth century, labor force participation rates of older individuals steadily declined. In order to finance a

55

56 Clark and Morrill

retirement of 10 or 15 years, individuals must save throughout their
working years. The establishment of Social Security in 1935 promised workers a base income for retirement and thus helped individuals
accumulate sufficient income for retirement. In the post–World War
II period, employers began offering pension plans that provide additional retirement income. As these plans spread across the economy,
employers developed pensions that provided significant incentives
for workers to retire at or before age 65. The phenomenon of employers encouraging retirement at relatively young ages was the result of a
rapidly growing population that enabled firms to hire younger workers
at lower wages. Rising educational attainment and the emergence of
new technologies reduced the competitive advantage of experience.
Thus, changing economic and demographic conditions provided the
impetus for employers to develop employment and compensation
policies that encouraged retirement at specific ages.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, individuals began to reassess early
retirement, and the labor force participation rates rose for men and
women aged 55 and over. This reversal of the trend toward early
retirement was influenced by changes in Social Security policies, the
shift from defined benefit to defined contribution plans, and increased
life expectancy. As workers seek to delay retirement, firms must
review their policies and determine whether they will accommodate
later retirements or develop new programs that achieve the desired
retirement ages of their employees.
This analysis began with the premise that, compared to workers
in the twentieth century, individuals today want to remain in the labor
force until older ages. Economists and policy analysts have noted the
difficulties of accumulating sufficient resources to finance greater
longevity. The annual saving rates needed to achieve a desired standard of living in retirement are higher when the expected length of
retirement is 25 or 30 years compared to 15 or 20 years. Changes in
Social Security and low interest rates imply that delaying the claiming of Social Security benefits results in present value gains, which
provide insurance against living to very old ages. As a result, extending work life has become a rallying cry in the popular press and in
research studies.
Analyses of delayed retirement generally focus on the workers’
perspective—rarely do studies consider the impact of delayed retire-
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ment on employers. In this book, we ask whether employers will
be willing and able to accommodate workers’ preferences to retire
later. Workers’ retirement decisions will ultimately depend on lifetime compensation, employers’ human resource policies, and government policies and programs. While labor supply changes associated
with increased work life have received considerable attention in the
literature, much less is understood about potential changes in labor
demand.
Throughout this book, we have analyzed the employer perspective of the evolving paths to retirement. For many individuals, the
norm is no longer for workers to move directly from full-time work
to complete retirement. Instead, many move to new jobs, seeking
reduced hours, new challenges, or less stressful environments. They
are able to continue working, potentially at lower annual earnings
because they can draw on Social Security, employer pensions, and
other savings. Some retirees move into self-employment and enjoy
the ability to manage their own time. These transitions may occur at
the time of retirement from one’s career job or after a period of no
work. Employers must then determine whether to hire or retain this
growing segment of the labor force.
It is interesting to consider the different challenges facing career
employers whose employees defer retirement as opposed to firms that
hire workers in this postretirement market. A key question for both
types of employers is, can employment and compensation policies
be offered in which the value of older workers is sufficiently high
relative to their costs? Of course, these working conditions must also
meet the preferences of workers attempting to delay retirement. An
important issue for future research is whether individuals are better
off switching jobs or attempting to work with career employers to
achieve appropriate employment terms.
CAREER EMPLOYER CONCERNS WITH
DELAYED RETIREMENT
When career employees delay retirement, the most important
issue for employers is the impact of an aging labor force on produc-

58 Clark and Morrill

tivity and labor costs. Many employers believe that after some point
productivity begins to decline. Hourly, or even annual, productivity
is hard to measure in many jobs. While some studies have tried to
capture the path of productivity over a career, these measures tend to
be noisy and unreliable. It is certainly true that gains and declines in
productivity will vary substantially across workers. These individual
differences around general age patterns of productivity provide a
rationale for age discrimination laws. These laws were often adopted
in response to concerns that firms were limiting the opportunities of
workers in the second half of their careers, when they were aged 40
and older. These same laws might now prevent employers from altering employment conditions that would make the retention of older
workers more desirable.
While productivity may be difficult to measure, earnings are
more easily observable. The literature contains many studies estimating age-earnings profiles. Administrative data clearly show a rise in
annual earnings with job tenure. Most economic studies have focused
exclusively on earnings as a measure of labor costs. Chapter 2 shows
that the cost of employee benefits—especially health insurance,
pension contributions, and paid time off—also increases with age.
Economic theory indicates that when a worker’s marginal productivity falls below the marginal cost of his employment to the firm,
then a profit-maximizing firm would like for this employee to retire.
Employers have developed personnel policies and compensation systems to create incentives to retire around certain ages.
Profit-maximizing firms must determine the optimal number of
workers to be employed and also the appropriate mix of individuals
at different ages. Pay scales and benefits help the firm first attract the
desired labor force and then retain those workers. Policies are also
developed to give employees incentives to retire when it is optimal
for the employer. If workers do not retire around these ages, the firm
will be adversely affected. Delayed retirement by older workers will
limit the promotion prospects of younger workers and reduce the ability of the firm to hire new employees.
The preference for an orderly retirement of employees around
specific ages does not imply that older workers have no value. Rather,
it follows from an assessment that their productivity has fallen below
cost. Workers make retirement decisions based on their own prefer-
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ences and resources in an effort to maximize utility over their remaining years. With increases in life expectancy and reductions in public
and private retirement benefits, it is easy to see why career employees may want to retire at older ages, given current compensation and
workloads.
EMPLOYER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE
If we assume that the desire for extended work life will continue
to rise, we must then consider how employers will respond. The decisions of workers to remain on the job may not be optimal for the
employer. In addition, employers may seek to develop compensation
policies that take advantage of an older workforce that may desire
fewer hours and lower levels of benefits but may also have higher levels of experience and job-specific knowledge. Employers might find
that, all else equal, it is optimal to accommodate workers’ preferences
for working longer by modifying job assignments and compensation
policies. However, they may also face barriers to making adjustments
to working conditions and compensation. Such barriers may include
union contracts, age discrimination laws, pension regulations, and
production techniques. Workers might consider remaining with their
employers for lower compensation if they could work fewer hours
and have less responsibility.
Phased retirement and return-to-work policies might fit both
worker preferences and employer concerns. The use of these policies in today’s economy is somewhat limited, despite the fact that
many workers might prefer restructured compensation while remaining with their current employers rather than retiring and seeking new
employment in a bridge job. Employers may have informal policies
that aim to keep the best workers but may be reluctant to have a broad
program that offers phased retirement to all qualified employees. This
may be due to the difficulties of developing cost-neutral policies and
production techniques that work better with full-time employees.
Employers also seem reluctant to adopt such policies for fear that
they might run afoul of federal and state age discrimination policies.
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Given current trends and public policies, it seems likely that firms
will be faced with increasing demand by employees to delay retirement. New research is needed to provide a better framework in which
to evaluate the impact of this expected change on labor costs and productivity. For example, would individuals actually prefer a decreasing wage profile at the end of a career prior to complete retirement?
Would this type of contract be more appealing if framed as a lifetime
compensation package rather than a decline in salary at the end of
career? The presence of bridge jobs suggests that lower wages and
fewer hours are appealing to some older workers.
Do workers prefer bridge jobs to a “tapering” contract because
it avoids the feelings of loss? The behavioral economics literature
has addressed how intertemporal choice and time discounting affects
individuals’ preferences regarding when in their careers they receive
the highest levels of compensation (e.g., Loewenstein and Sicherman
[1991]). One explanation offered for why we do not observe decreasing wage profiles at older ages is that individuals might experience
“loss aversion” when their salaries are lowered (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979). A useful research agenda would combine insights
from behavioral economics with a consideration of how best to construct optimal employment contracts that would extend the work life
of workers. The employer may gain from a contract that includes
tapering as a cost-effective means of maintaining firm-specific human
capital, while the worker might benefit from a contract that avoids the
perception of a loss.
In the longer term, if employers accommodate longer work lives
for employees, does this lead to new types of employment contracts?
For example, if phased retirement becomes a normative arrangement,
then we might expect adjustments in employment contracts that precommit workers to lower salaries and/or benefits at older ages. Do
employers find it more efficient to set up formal policies regarding
retirement transitions, such as phased retirement options or return to
work postretirement? If so, are tax policies and government-provided
retirement benefits designed optimally to allow for new types of
employment relationships? What new types of employment contracts
are currently being introduced to accommodate trends toward working longer?
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IMPACT OF POTENTIAL CHANGES IN PUBLIC POLICY
If working longer is deemed to be beneficial for individuals,
society, and the economy, government policies could be adopted to
increase incentives for individuals to remain in the labor force and
for firms to employ older workers. Identifying and removing any real
or perceived age discrimination issues associated with phased retirement programs would encourage firms to adopt such plans. Firms
could then consider modifying working conditions and compensation
policies in order to increase the probability that older workers are
cost effective. Redesigned jobs and reduced working hours combined
with access to retirement benefits when entering phased retirement
could make employees more willing to leave full-time employment
and accept these new conditions. Such redesigned jobs may well be
more appealing to individuals wishing to prolong their work lives
than entering the bridge job market. In Chapter 3, we examine how
phased retirement policies are widespread in higher education and are
generally viewed as a win-win for faculty and institutions.
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND LABOR
MARKET RESPONSES
Market wage rates are determined by demand for and supply of
workers. Population aging and the increase in the proportion of the
65-and-older population who want to remain in the labor force should
result in downward pressure on the market wage for these workers.
In particular, we would expect that wages of older workers would
decline, which should increase employment opportunities for older
workers. A more slowly growing population implies smaller entering
cohorts. Thus, as firms find that hiring younger workers is more difficult and costly, the demand for older workers might increase.
Much of the analysis in this book has focused on the impact of
delayed retirement on individual employers, holding constant market
forces. In many respects, this is how a firm would view these changes.
However, demographic changes and any ensuing macroeconomic
shifts will alter the labor market over time in fundamental ways not
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discussed in this book. For example, downward pressure on market
wages will increase the willingness of firms to accommodate preferences for older retirement ages.
We have outlined how individual employers might view a sudden
change in the retirement ages of its current workforce, and we emphasize how the push toward delayed retirement might not be desirable
to individual employers. We speculate that as individuals choose
to delay retirement, firms will respond by developing new types of
employment contracts more suited to the preferences of older workers
and consistent with their changing value to firms.
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